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INTRODUCTION

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Acti (VRA)-the crucial provision banning racial vote dilution-does not mention racial polarization in voting.2 Nor does polarization feature prominently in
the list of factors included in the Senate report accompanying the
Act; it is addressed by just one of the list's ten or so items.3 Nevertheless, thanks to the Supreme Court's epochal 1986 decision
construing the Act, Thornburg v Gingles,4 polarization is "the undisputed and unchallenged center" of vote dilution law.5 It accounts, in fact, for two of Gingles's three preconditions for liability: a "minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive" and also "must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc."6 Polarization is simply the
difference between these quantities: minority support for a
minority-preferred candidate minus white support for the
candidate.
Despite its doctrinal centrality, polarization remains a mysterious concept, both in theory and in practice. As a theoretical
matter, it is far from clear why a plaintiff must prove polarization
to prevail in a vote dilution challenge. Is it because polarization
t
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reveals discrimination by white voters against minority candidates of choice? Or because the pluralist marketplace is malfunctioning-the usual deals between groups not being made-when
polarization is high? Or because certain electoral policies can interact with polarization to prevent minority-preferred candidates
from winning office? And as a practical matter, it is even more
obscure how polarization should be established. The lower courts
are sharply divided as to the elections that are relevant, the levels
of minority cohesion and white bloc voting that are sufficient, the
way to identify minority candidates of choice, and many other
issues.
In their important new article,7 Professors Christopher
Elmendorf, Kevin Quinn, and Marisa Abrajano thoroughly canvass these theoretical and practical ambiguities. They also link
them; in their view, one reason why the mechanics of calculating
polarization are so uncertain is the underlying confusion over
why we care about the concept in the first place.8 Another, even
more fundamental reason is the gap the authors expose between
candidates' vote shares (the input in almost all polarization analyses) and voters' political preferences (the actual metric of interest).9 Candidates' performances are partly a function of voters'
views-but only partly. They are also inevitably a function of candidates' own characteristics: their race, ideology, competence, and
so on. Because of this gap, the authors recommend scrapping the
usual methodology for computing polarization. 10 In its place, they
tantalizingly hint that survey responses should be substituted for
election results."

In this brief response, I first highlight the contributions the
authors have made to the understanding of racially polarized voting. Their most novel and penetrating insight-one that has escaped a generation of scholars and judges-is that, due to the nonrandom variation of candidate attributes, voter polarization
cannot be assessed simply by comparing minority cohesion and
white bloc voting in prior elections. Next, I offer some gentle rejoinders to the authors' relentlessly pessimistic account. The most
notable of these is that, at least in Supreme Court decisions, there
is actually a good deal of agreement that the basic aim of § 2 is to

7
See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn, and Marisa A.
Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U Chi L Rev 587 (2016).
8
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10 Id at 675.
11 Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 675-76 (cited in note 7).
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provide descriptive representation to geographically concentrated
minority groups. Lastly, I tentatively explore a future even more
radical than any contemplated by the authors: one in which vote
dilution could be proven with only the most cursory of polarization showings. This future, I suggest, is both true to the statutory
text and consistent with the predominant theory of § 2.

I. CONTRIBUTIONS
The mark of a great idea is that it changes how you see the
world. After being exposed to it, you can't go back to how you previously understood something. The authors' observation that
voter polarization is a function of both voters' own political preferences and candidates' characteristicsl2 is exactly such an idea.
After thinking it through, it becomes impossible to look at statistics about minority or white support for a candidate and conclude
that they capture the extent to which voters' views actually vary.
For a nice illustration, consider the polarization calculations
that Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Richard
Pildes (all preeminent voting rights scholars) present in their
casebook. In a 1980 city council election in Norfolk, Virginia, a
bivariate ecological regression indicated that 98 percent of black
voters supported a black candidate named Evelyn Butts, compared to just 5 percent of white voters. 13 According to the editors,
these figures mean that polarization in Norfolk was "quite high." 14
Black and white voters' preferences diverged by more than ninety
points.
But did they really? They certainly did in that particularelection-at least if the ecological regression was trustworthy, which
Professor James Greiner has shown the technique often is not. 15
But that election featured a black candidate who was "a civil
rights activist" (in fact, a plaintiff in the case that toppled
Virginia's poll tax) and a founder of the Concerned Citizens for

Id at 646-47, 652-60.
13 Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 679-81 (Foundation 4th ed 2012). See also
Brent Tarter, Evelyn Thomas Butts (1924-1993) (Encyclopedia Virginia, Nov 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FE5A-5N6V.
14
Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes, The Law ofDemocracy at 679-81 (cited in note 1).
15
See, for example, D. James Greiner, Re-solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics
and Legal Doctrinein the Melting Pot, 86 Ind L J 447, 464-65 (2011) (describing ecological
regression as "fragile" because it can, and often does, produce physically impossible
estimates).
12
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Political Education, "the most influential African American political organization in Norfolk during the 1970s."16 What if a black
candidate less associated with civil rights activism had run in
Butts's place? Would Norfolk's voters still have been as racially
divided?17 Butts's opponents also included a white candidate endorsed by the Concerned Citizens (who won a seat) as well as several more conservative white candidates (two of whom were
elected too).18 Would Norfolk's voters have sorted into the same

stark racial pattern if Butts had faced different opposition?
The answers to these questions are largely unknowable. And
that is precisely the authors' point. Observed levels of minority
cohesion and white bloc voting depend on both voters' political
preferences and candidates' attributes. Observed levels are therefore an unreliable measure of voters' preferences, because candidates' attributes always intervene to some degree. Once this insight is absorbed, it destabilizes all efforts to compute
polarization using actual election results. There is an unbridgeable gulf-who happens to be running in the election and how appealing they are-between these results and voters' underlying
views.

This argument is powerful in principle. It remains possible,
though, that at least in areas with substantial minority populations, a candidate's minority-preferred status overrides all other
drivers of vote choice. In that case, observed levels of minority
cohesion and white bloc voting (in an election involving a minority
candidate of choice) would be an accurate measure of voters' political preferences. Other candidate characteristics would not affect voters' decisions.
In a second major contribution, the authors empirically dismiss this possibility. They conduct a series of experiments in
which candidates' attributes (race, education, endorsements, military service, and so on) are either set or varied randomly, and
subjects are then asked which candidate they would vote for.19

16

Tarter, Evelyn Thomas Butts (1924-1993) (cited in note 13).
17 The answer is probably no. A different black candidate received about 30 percent
support from white voters in both 1978 and 1982. See Collins v City of Norfolk, Virginia,
605 F Supp 377, 388 (ED Va 1984).
18 See Collins v City of Norfolk, Virginia, 883 F2d 1232, 1238-39, 1241 (4th Cir
1989). The election was at-large and for three seats. See Collins, 605 F Supp at 382.
19 See Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 656-59 (cited in note 7).
These experiments are described in more detail in a subsequent paper. See generally
Marisa A. Abrajano, Christopher S. Elmendorf, and Kevin M. Quinn, Using Experiments
to Estimate Racially Polarized Voting (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper No 419,
Feb 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P8ED-NFCH.

http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol83/iss1/14

4

Stephanopoulos: The Relegation of Polarization

164

The University of Chicago Law Review Online

[83:160

The results leave no doubt that factors other than minoritypreferred status influence vote choice. For example, Latino-white
polarization jumps from 21 percent to 36 percent when the opponent of the Latino candidate of choice is a white conservative (rather than a randomized white candidate).20 Similarly, black support for a "low quality" black candidate is only 42 percent,
compared to 54 percent for a randomized black candidate.21
To be sure, this is not the first time that surveys have appeared in the literature on polarization. In earlier work, Greiner
and Professor Quinn showed how polls could be combined with,
or substituted for, ecological regression to counteract the
method's drawbacks and produce more accurate estimates.22 But
the authors' use of surveys is different. Their polls are not just a
way to generate individual-level data and thus to circumvent the
problems that afflict ecological analysis. Rather, their polls are a
response to an even more vexing difficulty: the disjunction between election results and voters' political preferences. By setting
or varying hypothetical candidates' characteristics, these experiments enable voters' underlying views to be determined more accurately than through any approach that relies on actual candidates-whether ecological analysis or more conventional surveys.
This is a significant advance that, if implemented in litigation,
would revolutionize the field. It would sweep away the innumerable issues with which courts currently struggle when assessing
polarization and replace them with an elegant technique fully
adaptable to the case at hand.
II. CRITICISMS
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that I think
very highly of the authors' article. I would say, in fact, that it is
the finest piece of legal scholarship to date on racial polarization
in voting-an impressive doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical
achievement. However, it does seem to me that the authors paint
an overly gloomy picture at times. With respect to the lower
courts' methodological disagreements, the entire judiciary's supposed "normative dissensus,"23 and the feasibility of just muddling

20
21
22

See Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 659-60 (cited in note 7).
Id at 660.
See D. James Greiner and Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting:

Combining Individual-Level andR x C Ecological Data, 4 Annals Applied Stat 1774, 178793 (2010). See also Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 487-96 (cited in note 15).
23 Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 679 (cited in note 7).
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through, the situation is not as dire as the authors claim. Disruptive change may still be the best course, but if so, this is because
there is much room for improvement, not because the status quo
is so calamitous.
A. Doctrinal Confusion
Start with the diverging approaches taken by the lower
courts to many of the components of the polarization inquiryground previously covered by Professor Ellen Katz and her coauthors,24 but more thoroughly plowed here. According to the authors, this divergence has a dramatic explanation: a bitter dispute
over the very meaning of vote dilution, leading judges in each
camp to adopt the interpretations most consistent with their conception of the harm.25 Here, on the other hand, is a more anodyne
story: since Gingles itself, the Supreme Court has never commented on minority cohesion or white bloc voting at any length.
It has occasionally touched on these topics,26 but it has never answered any of the questions that have preoccupied the lower
courts.
Faced with the justices' silence, the lower courts have done
what lower courts do. They have decided hundreds of cases as best
they could, each one involving different facts, different experts,
different evidence on polarization, and so on. They have decided
these cases, moreover, not as one undifferentiated judicial cohort,
but rather as distinct circuit and district courts (and often without the possibility of intermediate appellate review).27 It is no surprise that a good deal of doctrinal confusion has arisen from all of
this activity. A good deal of doctrinal confusion generally arises
when the lower courts are left to their own devices for decades,
churning through cases without any guidance from above.
I can't be sure that my more prosaic explanation is correct. A
point in its favor, though, is that the same kind of legal muddle
has emerged in several other areas of voting rights doctrine. Prior
24 See Ellen Katz, et al, Documenting Discriminationin Voting: Judicial Findings
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982; Final Report of the Voting Rights
Initiative, University ofMichigan Law School, 39 U Mich J L Ref 643, 663-75 (2006).
25 See Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 636-45 (cited in note 7).
26 See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens v Perry, 548 US 399,
427 (2006) ("LULAC") (briefly noting that the second and third Gingles prongs were satisfied); Abrams v Johnson, 521 US 74, 92-93 (1997) (briefly noting that the second and third
prongs were not satisfied).
27 See 28 USC § 2284(a) (requiring three-judge district courts when congressional or
state legislative districts are challenged); 28 USC § 1253 (providing for direct appeal to
the Supreme Court from decisions of three-judge courts in many cases).
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to Gingles, for instance, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional cause of action for racial vote dilution but said little about
the theory's contours. 28 In response, as the authors themselves
note, "[a] free-form jurisprudence soon developed in the lower
courts," with judges unpredictably nullifying or upholding different electoral policies.29 Likewise, there is just as much uncertainty over Gingles's first prong-especially its geographic compactness requirement-as over its second and third elements.
Some courts essentially ignore compactness; others examine it
spatially; still others conflate it with traditional districting criteria; and the Supreme Court, on one occasion, construed it in terms
of cultural commonality.30
And over the last few years, doctrinal chaos has ensued on a
whole new front: the validity under the VRA of measures that
make it more difficult to vote, most notably photo ID requirements. The Supreme Court has yet to wade into this debate. Lacking a definitive pronouncement from it, the lower courts have
hopelessly splintered. Some have focused on discriminatory intent, 31 others on discriminatory effect.32 Among those prioritizing
effect, an array of tests has been mooted but no consensus has
been reached. Additional disputes rage over the right benchmarks
for comparison, the most probative types of evidence, and several
other issues.33 Once again, the judicial disagreements the authors
identify seem typical rather than exceptional-par for the course
when subordinates in a hierarchical system proceed without instructions from their superior.
B. Vote Dilution Theories
Next, take the vote dilution theories the authors discuss: the
proportional
representation,
coalitional-breakdown,
voterdiscrimination, and League of United Latin American Citizens v
Perry34 ("LULAC") models. The authors present these theories as
See White u Regester, 412 US 755, 764 (1973).
Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 595 (cited in note 7).
30 For a description of the lower courts' approaches to compactness, see Katz, et al,
39 U Mich J L Ref at 662-63 (cited in note 24). For the Supreme Court's embrace of cultural compactness, see LULAC, 548 US at 423-43.
31 See, for example, North CarolinaState Conference of NAACP V McCrory, App No
16-1468, slip op at 11 (4th Cir July 29, 2016).
32
See, for example, Veasey u Abbott, No 14-41127, slip op at 32-33 (5th Cir July 20,
2016) (en banc).
33 For a good snapshot of this litigation, see Major Litigation That Could Impact
Voting Access (Brennan Center for Justice, Oct
13, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/D9CJ-K4Z2.
34
548 US 399 (2006).
28
29
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if they all stand on similar footing-comparable in their doctrinal
and academic support. 35 But one of the accounts, the proportional
representation theory (about whose title more in a moment), is
clearly predominant, and by comparison, the other models are
mere sideshows. In Gingles itself, an outright majority stated that
"[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is ... an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."36 That vote dilution is above all the denial of minority voters' representation by their candidates of choice was
recognized by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in Gingles,37 by
Justice Clarence Thomas in a fire-and-brimstone opinion eight
years later,38 and by Chief Justice John Roberts in LULAC39-all
jurists who might have preferred a different theory. The ascendance of this view is also common knowledge among scholars; in
Professor Karlan's words, it enjoys "talismanic status."40
In contrast, the other theories represent minor, even discarded, strands of vote dilution doctrine. For example, the
coalitional-breakdown model focuses on minority voters' ability to
participate in the political process and this process's responsiveness to their substantive interests. Both participation and responsiveness were important elements of the pre-Gingles case law.41
Post-Gingles, though, they have been demoted to mere entries in
the list of Senate factors, divorced from the crucial preconditions
for liability.42 The Supreme Court has also rejected

§ 2 claims for

influence districts43-eVen though these districts, which require
35
See Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 629-36 & nn 220, 226,
242, 248 (cited in note 7).
36
Gingles, 478 US at 47 (emphasis added).
37
See id at 93 (O'Connor concurring in the judgment) ("[E]lectoral success has now
emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims.").
38
See Holder u Hall, 512 US 874, 899 (1994) (Thomas concurring in the judgment)
("[T]he Court has determined that the purpose of the vote ... is controlling seats.").
39 See LULAC, 548 US at 494 (Roberts concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("[T]he concern of the Voting Rights Act [is] to ensure
minority voters an equal opportunity 'to elect representatives of their choice."').
40 Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting
Rights Act, 77 Va L Rev 1, 29 (1991). See also, for example, Adam B. Cox and Thomas J.
Miles, JudicialIdeology and the Transformationof Voting Rights Jurisprudence,75 U Chi
L Rev 1493, 1500 (2008) ("The Gingles framework focused ...
on the electoral success of
minority-preferred candidates."); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting
Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich L Rev 1077, 1078 (1991)
("The belief that black representation is everything has defined litigation strategy under
the Voting Rights Act.").
41
See, for example, White, 412 US at 765-70; Zimmer u McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297,
1305-07 (5th Cir 1973) (en banc).
42
See Voting Rights Act Extension at 28-29 (cited in note 3).
43
See LULAC, 548 US at 445-46.
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minority voters to work with other voters to elect mutually acceptable candidates, are the ones most consistent with a coalitional approach.
Similarly, the voter-discrimination theory holds that the defeat of minority-preferred candidates is most troublesome when
they lose because of voter prejudice (not partisanship, socioeconomic status, or some other factor). But in Gingles, the plurality
declared that "[i]t is the difference between the choices made by
blacks and whites-not the reasons for that difference"-that
matters legally.44 The plurality's position was implicitly endorsed
by a majority of the Court in 1997 and again in LULAC. On both
of those occasions, the Court took polarization statistics at face
value, without ever asking what might account for the figures.45
And as for the LULAC theory, it is a stretch to call it a fullblown model of vote dilution. LULAC's key holdings were that a
minority population is not "compact" when its members are culturally and socioeconomically dissimilar, and that a district enclosing such a population is not a valid § 2 remedy.46 These are
notable glosses of Gingles's first prong and of the proper remedies
in § 2 litigation. But that is all they are. They imply nothing about
Gingles's second and third prongs, about the list of Senate factors-or about the real meaning of vote dilution.
The proportional representation theory is thus, at the very
least, first among equals. Given this status, it is important to be
clear about what exactly the theory specifies. And on this front, I
think the term proportionalrepresentationis inapt, as is the authors' claim that "I[o]n this view . .
the ratio of the number of
[minority-opportunity] districts . . to the total number of districts
should roughly equal the ratio of the minority population to the
total population."47 As I have explained elsewhere, a more accurate statement of the theory is that minority voters should be able
to elect their preferred candidates to the extent permitted by their
geographic distribution, up to a ceiling of proportionality.48 This
version acknowledges the vital role played by minority voters'
spatial patterns. It is also truer to the Court's view of proportionality, which boosts plaintiffs' cases when it is absent and undercuts them when it is present. 49
44
45
46
47
48

Gingles, 478 US at 63 (Brennan) (plurality).
See Abrams, 521 US at 93; LULAC, 548 US at 427.
See LULAC, 548 US at 423-43.
Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 630 (cited in note 7).
See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 Stan L Rev 1323,
1333-39 (2016).
49 See Johnson u De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1013-17 (1994).
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Are these just semantic differences? No, because when geography is taken into account, minority voters do not (and should
not be expected to) achieve proportional representation. The problem for minority voters is that, in most jurisdictions, they are not
allocated efficiently enough to attain proportionality. Rather,
they tend to be too concentrated in a few areas and not concentrated enough in many other regions. At present, consequently,
minority voters are underrepresented in Congress and in nearly
every state legislature.50 In many states, moreover, there are no
more geographically compact, minority opportunity districts that
can be drawn.51 Proportionalrepresentationis thus a misleading
label for the leading theory of vote dilution because it implies that
minority voters can and should be proportionally represented.
Representation to the extent allowed by geography is the clunkier,
but more correct, term.
C. Exogenous Data
There is one last reason why I am somewhat more sanguine
than the authors about the current state of racial polarization
doctrine. It is that while the authors focus on endogenous election
results (for the institution at issue in the litigation), exogenous
results (for other offices) can also be used to calculate polarization. True, exogenous results are just as vulnerable to the authors' central criticism-they too are a function of both voters'
preferences and candidates' characteristics. And, true, voting at
other governmental levels may involve different issues and concerns. Nevertheless, exogenous data has significant advantages
over endogenous data: it enables litigants to compute polarization
for many jurisdictions simultaneously, to compare the resulting
estimates, and to reach conclusions about where voting is more
and less polarized.52 Exogenous data thus makes possible the
analysis of Gingles's second and third prongs even after the authors' point about candidates' attributes has been grasped.

50
See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U Chi L Rev
769, 834 (2013).
51 See Nate Silver, Geography, Not Voting Rights Act, Accounts for Most MajorityMinority Districts (FiveThirtyEight, June 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/48DKLFQ2 (describing the "tendency of racial minorities to be concentrated in a group of overwhelmingly Democratic districts" and how "most [majority-minority districts] arise as a
result of the geographic distribution of minority voters").
52
See, for example, Texas u United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133, 142 (DDC 2012), vacd
and remd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013) (noting that exogenous data "allow[] comparison between
benchmark and proposed districts").
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An example may be helpful here. In the 2004 presidential
election, President George W. Bush faced off against Senator
John Kerry, and in 2008, Senator Barack Obama opposed Senator
John McCain. Measured at the state level, black-white polarization in voting was somewhat higher in 2008 than in 2004 (53 percent versus 48 percent). This rise does not mean that voters' underlying preferences were more divergent in 2008; the larger gap
could also have stemmed from the candidates' idiosyncratic features (in particular, Obama's race). But while inter-temporalcomparisons are suspect, inter-jurisdictionalcomparisons are quite
feasible. For instance, Alabama was much more polarized than
Alaska in both 2004 and 2008 (74 percent versus 54 percent; 87
percent versus 62 percent). So was Mississippi relative to
Missouri, Virginia relative to Vermont, and so on. 53
By relying more heavily on exogenous data, then, it becomes
more realistic than the authors believe to just muddle through.
As I have stressed, exogenous data is not without its flaws. But
by keeping the candidates constant from one jurisdiction to the
next (in the context of a particular election), it allows judgments
about relative polarization to be made. And for litigation purposes, such judgments are all we really need. They are enough to
analyze Gingles's second and third prongs even if they do not reveal the true polarization of voters' preferences.

III. IMPLICATIONS
Suppose I'm wrong, though, about the usefulness of exogenous data. Suppose also that courts deem opinion surveys-especially surveys involving randomized attributes of hypothetical
candidates-too fanciful to be admissible. What happens then to
the analysis of polarization? The authors offer a series of ideas.
Polarization could become part of the totality-of-circumstances inquiry rather than a precondition for liability. Polarization could
be replaced by some proxy for intentional discrimination. Or it
could be replaced by relative minority turnout. 54
These are all interesting suggestions. But to conclude this
piece, I want to consider an even more radical idea: eliminating
rather than amending Gingles's second and third prongs. In this
case, the only precondition for liability would be a showing that
at least one more reasonably compact majority-minority district

53
Polarization figures are on file with the author and are the basis for
Stephanopoulos, 68 Stan L Rev at 1358 (cited in note 48).
54
See Elmendorf, Quinn, and Abrajano, 83 U Chi L Rev at 675 (cited in note 7).
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could be drawn. As soon as a plaintiff made this showing, the spotlight would shift immediately to the list of Senate factors, without
any consideration of polarization.
Interestingly, even this extreme a tactic-collapsing
Gingles's three prongs into one-would not eradicate all traces of
polarization from the doctrine. A court would presumably want
some assurance that any new district it constructed would actually elect a minority candidate of choice. But how a district is
likely to perform can be determined only by studying the voting
patterns of minority and white voters-in short, by studying polarization. Likewise, a court would want to know to what extent
minority voters are already represented by their preferred candidates. Figuring out who these preferred candidates are also requires understanding minority voters' behavior at the polls.
These points, though, should not be overstated. In most cases,
it is reasonably clear whether a newly drawn district will elect a
minority candidate of choice. A district with a small minority population (say, below 25 percent) usually will not; a district with a
large minority population (say, above 45 percent) usually will;
and only in the space between these lines-a space now occupied
by very few districts55-is there substantial uncertainty. Simi-

larly, minority voters' representation by their candidates of choice
is rarely hard to assess. Most of these candidates both are readily
identifiable (thanks to their race or ethnicity) and represent
minority-heavy districts.56 The kind of polarization analysis that
would have to be conducted in a one-prong world, then, would be
much simpler and lower-stakes than that undertaken today. It
would never be dispositive for purposes of liability. In essence, it
would just amount to a check that judicial intervention would, in
fact, promote minority representation.
So conceived, why would a one-prong world be attractive?
One reason is its greater simplicity. With a single precondition for
liability rather than three, there would be two fewer issues for
litigants to brief, for experts to opine on, and for courts ultimately
to resolve. Another reason is closer fidelity to the statutory text.
The language of § 2 never mentions polarization, nor did the concept play a major role in the pre-Gingles case law. Gingles's elevation of polarization to linchpin status is thus odd and hard to
defend on conventional interpretive grounds.

55
See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County, 2013 S Ct Rev
55, 89, 100-01.
56
See id at 87-90.
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Perhaps the most important reason, though, is theoretical.
Gingles's second and third prongs conflict in certain cases with
the model I described earlier: minority voters' representation by
their preferred candidates, to the extent permitted by geography,
up to a ceiling of proportionality. Specifically, a clash ensues
whenever another geographically compact, minority opportunity
district could be drawn-but isn't because a court finds insufficient minority cohesion or white bloc voting. In these situations,
the polarization requirement frustrates § 2's representational
goal, and the goal could be furthered if the requirement were
waived.
On the other hand, the one remaining prong in a one-prong
world would assume even greater significance. And that prong's
centerpiece, geographic compactness, is just as untethered from
the statutory text as polarization, and in even starker tension
with minority voters' representation by their candidates of choice.
Many minority populations are spatially dispersed and thus unable to win vote dilution claims despite being as morally worthy
of representation as more concentrated groups. 57 Additionally, if
it were simpler for § 2 to be satisfied, concern would mount that
minority voters' improved descriptive representation would come
at a substantive cost. Minority voters' descriptive and substantive
representation are inversely related in certain circumstances,58
meaning that an easier-to-prove vote dilution action is not an unalloyed good.
CONCLUSION

Because the arguments in both directions are strong, I'm not
yet sure whether polarization should be relegated to the sidelines
of vote dilution doctrine. I am sure, though, that the authors deserve a good deal of credit for broaching this possibility-for highlighting the flaws in how polarization is calculated and thus
prompting scholars and judges to reconsider Gingles's second and
third prongs. Ever since Gingles, there has been a tendency in the
voting rights community to take the case as gospel, to operate entirely within its framework notwithstanding the strangeness of
that structure. The authors are among the first to contemplate a

57
See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U
Chi L Rev 1329, 1384, 1388 (2016).
58
See Stephanopoulos, 68 Stan L Rev at 1392-93 (cited in note 48) (empirically documenting this tradeoff when Republicans-but not Democrats or a nonpartisan body-are
responsible for redistricting).
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post-Gingles legal landscape,
congratulated.
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and for that they should be
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